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Most empirical studies of the effect of incumbency conclude that being a defender of 
the seat is an advantage and that newcomers and challengers alike have increasingly 
lower probabilities of winning. Yet, the majority of these studies in eastern europe 
have been based on tumultuous political environments in which electoral rules change 
frequently. a test of the theory of how candidate traits such as legislative and local 
political experience increase incumbents’ electoral performance has not been done in 
an environment in which the electoral rules are stable. Furthermore, these studies are 
based in proportional representation (PR) systems, which amplify the role of the party 
leadership in determining candidate fate through candidate rankings. I examine 
Hungary’s mixed-member system using candidate-level panel data that covers 
Hungarian national elections from 1994 to 2010, and contains basic information on all 
candidates running in SMDs. I find that Hungarian SMD incumbents perform worse at 
the elections than their challengers. However, in the long run, legislative experience in 
SMDs neutralizes this effect. additionally, local politicians, such as mayors, manage to 
increase their vote share at national elections.
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Introduction
eastern european transitions to democracy have been accompanied by the repro-
duction of parliamentary elites.1 empirical studies across Central and eastern 
europe find that the percentage of inexperienced legislators—“newcomers”—has 
dramatically decreased.2 In fact, five electoral terms after the transitions, only about 
half of the MPs are newcomers.3 Turnover can be high in some cases, but the aver-
age number of terms spent in parliament increases. Since the early 1990s, incum-
bents and multi-tenured professional politicians fill party offices, have long and deep 
experience in local politics,4 and a high percentage seeks re-election. In the early 
2000s, three-quarter of the legislators in post-communist countries have some sort 
of political experience, including experience in parliament and local politics.5 all of 
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this suggests that the parliamentary elite has professionalized throughout eastern 
europe6 with the consequence that newcomers and challengers alike are a dying 
political breed.
Yet, the majority of these studies have been based on tumultuous political envi-
ronments in which electoral rules change frequently. a test of the theory of how 
legislative and local political experience as candidate traits increase one’s electoral 
performance has not been done in an environment in which the electoral rules are 
stable. Furthermore, these studies are based in proportional representation (PR) sys-
tems, which amplify the role of the party leadership in determining candidate fate 
through candidate rankings. However, in a system applying single-member districts 
(SMDs), voters have a greater say in deciding who gets elected, and thus can effec-
tively change the share of newcomers in parliament.
The majority of eastern european countries that went through a democratic tran-
sition in the first half of the 1990s chose to adopt proportional representation as 
electoral formula. although some have tried to replace PR with majoritarian elec-
toral rules, none have been completely successful. The main reason is argued to be 
that institutions of consensus democracy are not compatible with plurality voting 
systems. Thus, it is consensus democracy itself that hinders electoral reform.7 In this 
sense, Hungary with its mixed-member majority electoral system is a unique case in 
the eastern european context. additionally, relatively low levels of turnover makes 
Hungary a convenient choice to investigate the effect of incumbency in the eastern 
european context.8
The main question of this study is whether or not legislative and local political 
experience as candidate traits better one’s electoral performance in single-member 
districts. I use candidate-level panel data that cover Hungarian national elections 
from 1994 to 2010, and contain basic information on all candidates running in SMDs. 
I investigate the effect of local-level political positions on a data set of all legislators 
running in SMDs at the five consecutive elections between 1994 and 2010. I find that 
although the majority of the literature studying the effect of incumbency concludes 
that being a defender of the seat is an advantage, Hungarian SMD incumbents per-
form worse at the elections than their challengers.
Framework and Hypotheses
The dramatic increase of experienced legislators in eastern european parliaments 
indicate that parties take previous legislative and local experience into account when 
selecting candidates, and these candidates are increasingly more successful in secur-
ing their spots in parliament. Does this indicate that legislative and local political 
experience serve as Personal Vote-earning attributes (PVea) during election times? 
In their oft-cited volume, Cain et al. define personal vote as the proportion of votes 
received by a candidate that cannot be explained by variables like party affiliation, 
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fixed voter characteristics, and economic trends.9 Consequently, everything that is 
related to the candidates’ personal characteristics, history, and record can be consid-
ered as catalysts to personal vote.
electoral rules are one of the most important factors that influence the connection 
between PVea and electoral performance. When it comes to managing the connec-
tion between representatives and voters, the dispute unravels around the effects of 
majoritarian and proportional electoral formulas. The differences between the two 
major types of electoral systems come from the distinct philosophical roots (i.e., ter-
ritorial vs. proportional representation) and the application of single-member versus 
multi-member constituencies. One of the most frequently cited characteristics of 
single-member majority systems is that they create a strong accountability linkage.10 
Since one district has one single representative, the voters will be able to determine 
whom to reward or punish for the positive or negative outcomes.11 as SMD candi-
dates are only dependent on the votes cast for them, gathering extra votes is expected 
to increase their chances of re-election. The most convenient tool for this is advertis-
ing their appealing characteristics and achievements, in other words, personal vote-
seeking. In such systems, nominating candidates with PVea helps increase the 
chances for parties to bring in the district. Conversely, in multi-member constituen-
cies, where a geographical overlap among legislators confuses the link between vot-
ers and MPs the incentive to free-ride increases.12 The reason for this is that voters 
have difficulties identifying the representative responsible for the benefits, leaving 
little room for recognition and reward.13 In such systems, members are less account-
able to the electorate than to the party leadership,14 that essentially makes the fight 
for re-election a struggle for higher positions on the party list.15 Nevertheless, it has 
also been shown that ballot structure greatly differentiates between party list PR 
systems. The latter effect of multi-member districts described above is prevalent if 
the party lists are closed, where voters are not able to change the order of the candi-
dates by casting preference votes. Under these circumstances, the incentive to apply 
for personal vote is minimal. However, in open or flexible list systems, where voters 
may change the rank of candidates on the lists, intra-party competition increases the 
incentives to lean on PVea.16
The case of mixed-member electoral systems is particularly interesting for stu-
dents of the personal vote, because it offers them to investigate the effects of two 
vastly different rules under the same political context. In their edited volume, Shugart 
and Wattenberg define mixed electoral systems as one subset of multiple-tier sys-
tems, where two types of votes are cast: a nominal vote to one or more candidates, 
and a list vote for a—mostly closed—party list.17 as they put it, mixed-member 
electoral systems “offer voters a direct role in choosing an elected representative for 
their localities, but also provide some element of proportional representation.”18 The 
ability to cast multiple votes allows voters to express their party as well as personal 
preferences. In case the two do not match—in most cases—voters can always split 
the ticket: vote for a party list and vote for the candidate of a different party.
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Moser and Scheiner investigate whether voters split the ticket owing to strategic 
considerations or to favourable candidate characteristics in the case of five mixed-
member systems.19 They argue that unlike in germany, in systems with unlinked 
tiers (Russia, Lithuania, and Japan),20 personal vote will be more prominent in deter-
mining candidate support than strategic voting. Karp et al. conclude that in the case 
of New Zealand, candidate effects help explain ticket splitting.21 The results regard-
ing germany are mixed. On the one hand, Moser and Scheiner find that by the reason 
of its party-centeredness, german voters split the ticket strategically rather than cast-
ing a personal vote.22 Bawn also emphasizes that although the system is considered 
to be rather complex, german voters react strategically.23 On the other hand, 
Klingemann and Wessels argue that the grassroots performance of SMD candidates 
matters in determining electoral success.24 Scheiner also utilizes the importance of 
good candidates in Japan’s mixed electoral system.25 Based on various studies on the 
case of germany26 and New Zealand,27 Shugart concludes that mixed-member sys-
tems are more of “a personalization of PR” than “partisanization of SMDs.”28 
Therefore, there is reason to believe that the personal attributes of the candidates 
matter in determining electoral performance in a mixed system.29
The main question of this article is whether incumbency and SMD-level legisla-
tive experience functions as a PVea in an eastern european country that offers its 
voters to choose between candidates. as noted earlier, more and more legislators in 
the region have gathered political experience on various arenas of politics. Does this 
experience help candidates to increase their vote share? Can parties expect that they 
can better their performance in a given district by nominating the same candidate 
election after election? One of the dominating hypotheses in the literature of personal 
vote is that incumbency positively affects candidate vote share, and increases chances 
of re-election.30 The incumbency advantage is explained by the campaign value of 
incumbency,31 direct office holder benefits,32 visibility,33 constituency service,34 the 
increasing role of candidate quality,35 deterring challengers,36 or simply being better 
politicians.37 In a mixed-member setting, Burden38 emphasized the importance of 
experienced and incumbent candidates in Japan, Scheiner39 measures candidate qual-
ity with previous office holding experience, Moser and Scheiner40 confirms the 
power of incumbency for five countries with mixed electoral systems, while Bawn41 
finds that incumbency has a positive effect on the difference between the SMD and 
party votes in germany. Based on the evidence in the literature, I form the following 
hypotheses.
The SMD incumbency hypothesis: Candidates who are SMD incumbents receive a larger 
share of votes than their challengers.
The SMD tenure hypothesis: The larger the number of electoral terms in which the candidate 
served as an SMD MP, the higher the proportion of votes received by the candidate.
a large part of the literature on PVea focuses on the effect of local roots on 
national-level electoral performance. gallagher and Blais et al. emphasize the role of 
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nativity, while others focus more on local political experience.42 Shugart et al. argue 
that nativity is a proxy for local knowledge: those who were born in the constituency 
may know the needs of the constituents better.43 On the other hand, Putnam empha-
sizes the empirical connection between national and local offices by revealing that 
national-level electoral success is often accompanied by considerable local political 
experience.44 Some argue that lower-level political experience bears testimony of 
whether the candidates have the knowledge on how to reach the designated goals.45 
By lessening the information demand of voting, these characteristics also serve as 
heuristics that help voters to assess candidate quality.46 Cox also suggests that voters 
take the identity of the local representative into account, which draws parties to nom-
inate candidates with a local profile.47 Heinelt and Hlepas classify the Hungarian 
local government system as a “strong mayor form” with an “executive mayor.”48 In 
practice, this does not only mean that the mayor is the administrative leader of the 
local government, but that in the eye of the citizens he or she appears as the only 
leader of the municipality. a fairly large percentage of the Hungarian legislators 
filled in the position of the mayor before and during their legislative mandate.49
The mayor hypothesis: Mayors tend to receive a larger share of votes than candidates who did 
not serve as mayors at the time of the elections.
The Eastern European context
The majority of eastern european countries that went through a democratic tran-
sition in the first half of the 1990s chose to adopt proportional representation as 
electoral formula. although some have tried to replace PR with majoritarian elec-
toral rules, none have been completely successful. The main reason is argued to be 
that institutions of consensus democracy are not compatible with plurality voting 
systems. Thus, it is consensus democracy itself that hinders electoral reform.50 
although Romania temporarily51 managed to switch from PR to mixed-member 
electoral rules, the system has remained fairly proportional.
In light of this, with its mixed-member majority system,52 Hungary is a peculiar case 
within the eastern european context. electoral rules adopted in 1990 have been largely 
unchanged for twenty years after the transition. although less than half of the legislators 
(176, 45.6 percent) were elected in single-member districts, the elections created fairly 
disproportional results favouring large parties. Its success in moving towards a majori-
tarian political system differentiates Hungary from other eastern european countries 
where institutions of consensus democracy successfully prohibited the majoritarian shift 
with regards to electoral rules.53 additionally, the logic of the electoral rules created a 
two-block system in 2002 that was replaced with one-party hegemony in 2010.54 The 
party system became more concentrated and the role of winning in the SMDs is said to 
become more and more important for winning the elections. Consequently, the impor-
tance of candidate characteristics that may attract personal vote increased.
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In 1989, one of europe’s most complicated electoral systems was put in place by 
the Hungarian Parliament. From 1990 to 2014, Hungary had a mixed-member 
majority system with partial compensation55 with no seat linkage. a total of 386 
representatives were elected on three tiers; 176 MPs came from SMDs (first tier), 
while 210 members obtained their seats from closed regional (second tier with the 
19 counties and the capital city) and national-level (third tier) party lists. Hungarian 
voters, however, could only cast two votes: one for an SMD candidate and another 
for a regional party list. The system allowed for ticket splitting, candidacy on mul-
tiple tiers as well as multiple office holding. The latter means that legislators were 
also allowed to hold elected local positions, such as the positions of the mayor or a 
local council member.
Based on the above, the Hungarian electoral system should fall half-way between 
being candidate- and party-centred. The SMD tier strengthens personal vote-seek-
ing and personalization, while the closed list tiers emphasize the role of the parties. 
There are several circumstances that despite the dominance of the SMD tier push 
the system towards the more party-centred end of the continuum. These factors are 
hardly unique to Hungary: Several are characteristic to the majority of post-commu-
nist and new democracies. First, candidate selection being utterly centralized,56 the 
personal vote-seeking incentive of SMD candidates remains at a quite low level. 
Second, Hungarian voters are demonstrated to hold strong partisan attachments.57 
They are also increasingly polarized,58 which makes it more difficult for them to 
switch parties. Third, voter polarization is also accompanied by an adequate level of 
polarization on the candidate level.59 With regards to legislators, strengthening 
party discipline characterizes the twenty-year period after the transition (1989/1990), 
which expands to parliamentary questioning and interpellations60 as well as voting 
in parliament.61
The question is whether there is any place for personal vote-seeking in a country 
with mixed-member electoral rules where party-centeredness prevails with regards 
to candidate selection as well as voting and elite behaviour. Interestingly, just as it 
would be expected on the basis of the literature, campaign personalization appears as 
an important factor in the SMD competition. The research of Chiru and Papp demon-
strate that the tier of candidacy and local political background increase the level of 
personalization during campaign.62 early 2015, a series of interviews were con-
ducted with campaign strategists that confirmed that even on the stage of candidate 
selection, PVea play an important role.63 Whenever parties have a considerably 
large pool of experienced SMD candidates at their disposal, they prefer to nominate 
candidates from this pool. Candidate data from the elections under investigation sup-
port this by showing that a considerable proportion of SMD candidates are rather 
experienced in campaigning on the first tier.64 This indicates that parties expect to 
increase their first-tier vote shares by nominating more experienced candidates. 
Ilonszki comes to a similar conclusion with regards to candidate selection strategies 
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right after the democratic transformation in 1989/1990.65 She argues that owing to 
anti-party sentiments in the early nineties, parties tried to select candidates who were 
able to compete on their own merits. Thus, candidates with more substantial local 
ties were preferred over party people in the constituencies.
Data and Variables
In the analysis, to model the electoral performance of Hungarian candidates I use 
the original data compiled by the project electoral Control in eastern europe.66 Data 
cover basic candidate information from 1994 to 2010. additionally, a data set is cre-
ated to investigate the effect of local political background on the electoral perfor-
mance of Hungarian MPs who have been serving between 1994 and 2010. Both data 
sets are organized in long form67 and contain all candidates and MPs running in 
SMDs at the respective elections.
The dependent variable of the analysis is the vote share of the SMD candidates 
in the first round at the five elections held in 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, and 2010. In 
the case of candidates, this variable is fairly skewed to the right (Figure 1); thus I 
Figure 1
The distribution of candidate vote share in single-member districts
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apply a log-transformation to obtain a more symmetric distribution. There is no 
need to do the same with regards to MPs; thus, in their case the raw vote share will 
be explained. another idea would be to explain the extent of ticket splitting, that is, 
the difference between candidate and party vote share. However, Hainmueller and 
Kern show that incumbency does not only bring an advantage on the SMD tier but 
it also increases party vote share in the district.68 Consequently, changing the value 
of incumbency as the main independent variable would change both components 
of the dependent variable. This way, the true effects on candidate vote share would 
be masked by the changes in the level of party vote. However, by controlling for 
party vote share on the right-hand side of the equation (as an independent vari-
able), it is ensured that vote share is kept artificially unchanged when changing the 
value of incumbency.
The key independent variables are SMD incumbent, SMD tenure, and Mayor. The 
SMD incumbent and the Mayor are dummies taking 1 if the SMD candidate was an 
incumbent in an SMD at the time of the election or a mayor, respectively, and 0 oth-
erwise. SMD tenure stands for the number of terms that the candidate has been serv-
ing as an SMD MP before the actual election.
Control variables
In order to be able to obtain the net effect of the independent variables, additional 
factors have to be taken into consideration.69 The literature makes a great effort in 
separating the “normal vote” from the personal vote. as Murray puts it, “the key 
difficulty in measuring candidate success is isolating the impact of the individual 
candidate from the other factors affecting the election result.”70 aside from candi-
date-specific variables, factors that influence the popularity of the candidate’s party 
on the national level have to be taken into account as well as aspects that explain the 
constituency’s deviation from this tendency. In the case of mixed-member electoral 
systems, however, these effects are easier to capture by controlling for the share of 
votes cast for the candidate’s party on the list tier. This variable should absorb gen-
eral tendencies in the overall popularity of the party as well as constituency-specific 
effects. In terms of their statistical distribution, party votes show similar tendencies 
to SMD vote share. Thus, I apply a log-transformed version of the variable in the 
case of candidates, and simply control for the vote share of the regional party list 
within the group of representatives. Nevertheless, one should keep in mind that the 
ability of nominating a regional party list depends on the number of SMD candidates 
the party was able to nominate.71 It often happens that some SMD candidates do not 
have their parties competing on the regional tier. Consequently, only those candi-
dates can be taken into account whose parties successfully nominated party lists in 
the respective regions.
The hypothesized effect of incumbency (SMD incumbency) has already been the-
orized. However, the group of challengers is not homogeneous in terms of their 
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parliamentary status: they are either former MPs elected on the party lists (List MP), 
or hold no legislative mandate at the time of the election. as a result of their differing 
visibility, they may attract personal votes to a different extent. Furthermore, there are 
candidates that are nominated by more than one party. Joint candidacy (Joint candi-
dacy) should be taken into account, because voters of the parties in question are 
likely to support the same candidates. also, candidacy on multiple tiers at the same 
time will be controlled for (Multiple candidacy).
Visibility is one of the reasons political experience may influence candidate vote 
share. However, visibility is not only connected to incumbency or prior political 
office-holding. Firstly, as the Hungarian electoral system allows for multiple candi-
dacy (i.e., nominating the same candidate on multiple electoral tiers), parties place 
party prominents and “important” candidates (who are most likely also more visible 
than “ordinary” candidates) not only in SMDs they are likely to win but also rela-
tively high on the party lists (Relative regional and national list position).72 Thus, the 
higher the SMD candidate gets on the party list, the larger his or her expected vote 
share in the SMD competition.73 Secondly, candidates who ran in the same district 
(Same district) at the previous elections might have the advantage of higher visibility 
over candidates who were forced to change their constituency of nomination. Thus, 
district change will also be controlled for as it is very likely to trigger changes in vote 
share. Thirdly, visibility might help candidates through their positions during the 
preceding electoral term. I will control for positions like government membership 
(Minister), party leadership (Party leader), and key positions in the legislature (Key 
position in parliament). as candidates in these positions are almost exclusively 
Members of Parliament, these variables will only be controlled for in the case of 
representatives to avoid multicollinearity. additionally, membership in local council 
(Local council member) is taken into account to sort out the effect of local-level vis-
ibility that may go with these positions.
Most of the studies concerning the personal vote control for the party, saying that 
there might be systematic differences in how candidates of the different parties 
exploit their personal vote-seeking attributes. However, in the case of Hungary, the 
party variable is difficult to control for in a longitudinal fashion—mostly because 
during the period under investigation, several parties disappeared, while new ones 
emerged. additionally, the coalition strategies changed, leading to difficulties mea-
suring the effect of the party variable in the case of joint candidates. Therefore, two 
variables were generated in the hope that they capture the most important aspects of 
the party variable’s effect. The first variable distinguishes between government and 
opposition parties (Government party). Parties often suffer vote loss at the next elec-
tion due to the unpopular decisions they have to make while in government. 
Karácsony shows that Hungarian voters evaluate parties retrospectively based on 
their performances during the previous electoral terms.74 Hungarian voters have 
excessive expectations with regards to what governments can do to improve the eco-
nomic environment.75 Thus, voters may even punish governments that execute 
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successful economic policies. as voters pursued trial-and-error tactics, a substantial 
share of votes was protest in nature, and at the same time, a proclamation of trust 
toward the new government.76
a further feature of the Hungarian political competition between 1994 and 2006 
is that two parties dominated the single-member constituencies: the Hungarian 
Socialist Party (Magyar Szocialista Párt, MSZP) and Fidesz–Hungarian Civic 
alliance (Fidesz–Magyar Polgári Szövetség). Thus, to control for the dominant party 
effect, the second variable separates candidates of these parties from that of the less 
successful ones. Candidates of MSZP and Fidesz (Dominant party) are expected to 
systematically receive a larger share of votes than candidates of other parties. 
Including this variable into the models comes with further advantages. It has been 
shown in several instances that in mixed electoral systems, rational voters give their 
first vote to candidates of large parties, who have a greater chance of winning than 
those of small ones.77 Thus, taking the dominant party effect into account, we account 
for the strategic nature of the vote as well. Consequently, the effects of the key inde-
pendent variables will indeed be personal in nature.
Some characteristics of the electoral district might also influence how candidates 
perform. Naturally, the larger the number of competing candidates in the SMD, the 
smaller the share of votes one candidate can expect (Electoral competition). To mea-
sure electoral competition in the district, I use the effective number of candidates.78 
additionally, electoral margin at the previous election was also taken into account to 
control for the expected fierceness of the competition in the given district (Electoral 
margin). Last but not least, I control for the lagged dependent variable, which is the 
vote share of SMD candidates at the preceding elections.
Results
To establish the effect of SMD incumbency and SMD tenure, I use three-level 
hierarchical regressions. The three levels are (1) candidates at the given election, (2) 
candidates, and (3) single-member districts. although the whole population of SMD 
candidates was observed, and thus no sampling was involved, I base the analysis on 
standard tests of significance. Table 1 presents the results of random intercepts mod-
els explaining the natural log of candidate vote share. In random intercepts models, 
the intercept of the model is allowed to vary across groups. In this case, all candi-
dates and SMD have different intercepts, whereas the slope coefficients remain 
unchanged for all observations.79 all models presented in this analysis have been 
checked for multicollinearity.80
Looking at the results of Model 1 (Table 1), it is clear that the party vote share 
excessively explains the individual candidates’ performance in the SMDs. This sup-
ports the claim that Hungarian politics is vastly party-centred, and split ticket voting 
is not the rule but the exception. The association, however, is not perfect, which 
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leaves room for other variables to step in. Starting with the effect of SMD incum-
bency, interestingly, SMD MPs must face a disadvantage when it comes to defending 
the seat. This contradicts the majority of the literature discussing the incumbency 
advantage. It seems that Hungarian voters do not only tend to punish governments 
retrospectively,81 but they act similarly with regard to individual candidates. 
Nevertheless, other MPs do not have to face this disadvantage: party list MPs get a 
larger share of votes than candidates trying to enter the parliament. The geographical 
overlap between list MPs in their regions does not diminish their personal potential 
in the SMD competition. In fact, results indicate that they are the ones with the most 
Table 1
Random Intercepts Multilevel Models Explaining Logged Candidate Vote 
Share
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
 DV: Logged Vote Share DV: Logged Vote Share DV: Logged Vote Share
Variables B (Se) B (Se) B (Se)
SMD incumbency −0.07 (0.02)*** −0.01 (0.01) −0.13 (0.02)***
SMD tenure 0.06 (0.01)*** 0.14 (0.03)*** 0.05 (0.01)***
List MP 0.09 (0.01)*** 0.08 (0.01)*** 0.04 (0.02)**
Party vote share in SMD 
(logged)
0.81 (0.01)*** 0.81 (0.00)*** 0.76 (0.01)***
Joint candidacy 0.09 (0.02)*** 0.09 (0.02)*** 0.08 (0.02)***
Multiple candidacy −0.04 (0.03) −0.04 (0.03) −0.13 (0.07)*
government party −0.01 (0.01) −0.01 (0.00)* −0.06 (0.01)***
Dominant party 0.18 (0.01)*** 0.18 (0.01)*** 0.14 (0.03)***
electoral competition 0.02 (0.00)*** 0.02 (0.00)*** 0.02 (0.01)***
electoral margin (t – 1) 0.11 (0.03)*** 0.12 (0.03)*** −0.16 (0.05)***
Interaction: SMD incum-
bency * SMD tenure
−0.11 (0.03)***  
Candidate vote share  
(t – 1) (logged)
0.16 (0.01)***
Same district 0.04 (0.02)**
Intercept 0.32 (0.03)*** 0.32 (0.03)*** 0.21 (0.07)***
SMD: sd(_cons) 0.03 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00)
Candidate sd(_cons) 0.16 (0.01) 0.16 (0.01) 0.12 (0.10)
sd(Residual) 0.24 (0.01) 0.24 (0.01) 0.22 (0.06)
Wald χ2 58,525.4 56,266.13 35,656.24
N 6,050 6,050 2,006
Log pseudo-likelihood −939.90 −928.30 −31.43
Note: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. entries are regression coefficients. Standard errors are in paren-
theses. estimation method: maximum likelihood.
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potential. The situation appears even more confusing if we look at the effect of SMD 
tenure. Candidates who served multiple terms as SMD representatives manage to 
increase their vote share compared with their competitors with less extensive SMD 
experience. Looking at these two variables, one could come to the conclusion that 
incumbency is clearly a disadvantage, but over time, experienced candidates are able 
to neutralize its negative effects.
However, before moving further with testing this claim, a few more words on 
this model is in order. Model 1 tested the effects of SMD incumbency and SMD 
tenure on the natural log of candidate vote share. However, this involves that 
small fluctuations in the data will have a stronger effect on the dependent vari-
able as it would have if raw candidate vote share was taken into account. 
according to the random intercept model explaining raw candidate vote share 
(see appendix B, Model a1) incumbency and escpecially SMD tenure have 
slightly larger effects than in the case of the above models.82 Nevertheless, there 
is no substantial difference in the magnitudes as well as in the directions of the 
effects. Incumbency still appears as a burden, whereas tenure helps candidates 
better their performance in the SMD competition. an additional concern with 
using the natural logarithm of the raw candidate vote share is that the models 
mostly engage with explaining variation in the vote share of marginal candidates. 
addresssing this concern, I re-ran Model 1, but this time with weigthing the 
observations by vote share, so that the model would downweight marginal can-
didates that dominate the data. Results are still not substantially different (see 
appendix B, Model a2). Comparing the diagnostic plots of the three models 
(appendix C), it seems that all models perform relatively poorly when it comes 
to estimate medium vote share. However, in the case of the smallest and the larg-
est values they perform surprisingly well. The model with the logged dependent 
variable appears to produce the most consistent results by fitting both small and 
high values well. The model with the weighted observations seems to allow for a 
larger variance in the fitted values in the case of large vote shares, while the 
model estimating raw vote share performs worse at small values. as to the resid-
uals, Model 1 estimates values closest to the observed data in the cases of medium 
and large vote shares. also, compared to Model a2 (weighted model), it does 
much better in the case of small values too. as the larger values are much more 
of interest than the lower end of the data, among the presented models, Model 1 
appears to best suit the purposes of this article.
Back to the effects of the main independent variables, based on the results of 
Model 1, namely that SMD incumbency has a negative effect on vote share, which 
may be compensated by SMD tenure, the question arises whether the effect of SMD 
tenure is the same across all groups of incumbency. Does experience really help 
SMD incumbents to overcome the negative effect of incumbency? To answer this 
question, in Model 2 (Table 1) I account for the interaction between SMD incum-
bency and tenure. The predictive margins displayed in Figure 2 indicate that although 
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tenure helps incumbents to gain back the votes they lost because of their incumbent 
status (see the positive slope of the dashed line on Figure 2), this effect is not as sub-
stantial as in the case of SMD challengers (see solid line on Figure 2). Thus, the 
disadvantage of SMD incumbents is twofold. First, they receive a smaller amount of 
votes than heir challengers, probably because of the punishing nature of Hungarian 
elections. Second, compared to challengers, they are less likely to profit from SMD 
experience.
To test the robustness of the results, several other model specifications were tried. 
The reults of Model 3 (Table 1) show that even when losing two-thirds of the sample 
size,83 controlling for candidate vote share at the preceding election does not change 
the effect of incumbency and tenure. We find similar results when taking into account 
the relative position of SMD candidates on the regional and national party lists. 
Models of Table 2 show that incumbency and tenure are still significant, and the 
magnitude of their effects does not change drastically. Furthermore, list positions 
appear to matter: as lower values stand for higher positions, the negative coefficients 
of Table 2 indicate that the higher someone gets on the party list relative to its length, 
the larger the expected vote share. as there is no considerable relationship between 
previous electoral performance and the candidates’ position on the party lists84—as 
one would assume—we can confirm that the connection exists not because parties 
place well-performing candidates on the top, but rather because list positions capture 
Figure 2
The predictive margins of incumbency over the different levels of tenure 
(CI=95 percent)
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some kind of visibility (or “prominence”) that appeals to voters when picking a can-
didates in the SMD.
Based on the results of the random intercepts models (see Tables 1 and 2), the dif-
ferent districts do not deviate from the sample mean substantially. The variation in 
the intercept among candidates is not considerably larger either. The average devia-
tion of candidates around the sample mean is 1.19 percentage points,85 which indi-
cates that there is a certain (undefined) quality of the candidates that results in their 
scoring slightly different levels of vote share. The next logical question to ask would 
be whether there is a difference in the slopes across the different levels of data. With 
other words, do different qualities affect vote share with different magnitudes? The 
results of Table 3 demonstrate that the effect of SMD tenure (Model 8) is constant 
across all candidates. In the case of incumbency, the slope coefficient varies with 
1.18 percentage points86 (Model 7) across individuals.
earlier I argued that it is important to keep party vote share unchanged when 
determining the effect of incumbency and tenure. I expressed some doubts about 
including party vote share on the left-hand side of the equation. However, to verify 
the findings, the difference between the candidate and the party vote (ticket splitting) 
Table 2
Random Intercepts Multilevel Models Explaining Logged Candidate Vote 
Share
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
 DV: Logged Vote Share DV: Logged Vote Share DV: Logged Vote Share
Variables B (Se) B (Se) B (Se)
SMD incumbency −0.06 (0.02)*** −0.04 (0.02)** −0.05 (0.02)***
SMD tenure 0.06 (0.01)*** 0.06 (0.01)*** 0.07 (0.01)***
Relative regional list 
position
−0.19 (0.02) *** −0.12 (0.03)***
Relative national list 
position
−0.17 (0.02)*** −0.14 (0.02)***
Control variables included
Intercept 0.34 (0.02)*** 0.36 (0.02)*** 0.38 (0.02)***
SMD: sd(_cons) 0.04 (0.01) 0.023 (0.01) 0.04 (0.01)
Candidate: sd(_cons) 0.17 (0.01) 0.18 (0.01) 0.17 (0.01)
sd(Residual) 0.22 (0.011) 0.20 (0.01) 0.20 (0.01)
Wald χ2 54,976.83 49,535.6 49,269.85
N 5,599 3,561 3,346
Log pseudo-likelihood −646.46 −307.67 −252.99
Note: See Table 1.
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was explained with random intercepts models. Positive values of the dependent vari-
able indicate that the candidate performed better then her party, while negative val-
ues reflect the advantage of the party. The models with (Model 10) and without 
(Model 9) the lagged dependent variable (Ticket splitting [t – 1]) in Table 4 confirm 
the findings presented above. Incumbency decreases candidate performance relative 
to the performance of the party, which effect may be neutralized by seniority in SMD 
representation.
Moving on, the effect of local political positions was investigated using the data 
on all Hungarian MPs who ran in SMDs between 1994 and 2010. The aim of the 
analysis is to show whether being a mayor at the time of the national elections help 
MPs to increase their vote shares. evidence from Table 5 points to the importance of 
the mayoral positon when competing in the single-member districts. Mayors receive 
2.07 percentage points more votes on avergae than their competitors. However, cur-
rent positions in the local council do not seem to be of any relevance. This difference 
between mayors and local council members is probably the product of the differing 
patterns of visibility due to the highlighted role of he mayor within the local govern-
ment. Heinelt and Hlepas classify the Hungarian local government system as a 
“strong mayor form” with an “executive mayor.”87 In practice, this does not only 
mean that the mayor is the administrative leader of the local government, but that in 
Table 3
Random Slope Multilevel Models Explaining Logged Candidate Vote Share
Model 7 Model 8
 DV: Logged Vote Share DV: Logged Vote Share
Variables B (Se) B (Se)
SMD incumbency −0.05 (0.02)*** −0.07 (0.02)***
SMD tenure 0.07 (0.01)*** 0.07 (0.01)***
Control variables included
Intercept 0.33 (0.03)*** 0.32 (0.03)***
SMD: sd(_cons) 0.03 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01)
Candidate: sd(SMD incumbency) 0.17 (0.01)  
Candidate: sd(SMD tenure) 0.00 (0.00)
Candidate: sd(_cons) 0.16 (0.01)
sd(Residual) 0.23 (0.01) 0.24 (0.22)
Wald χ2 62,466.82 58,525.46
N 6,050 6,050
Log pseudo-likelihood −937.36 −939.90
Note: see Table 1.
16 east european Politics and Societies and Cultures
the eye of the citizens he or she appears as the only leader of the municipality. On the 
contrary, local council members appear “faceless” most of the time.88 The result is 
that while being a mayor has an immediate and direct effect on visibility and thus 
electoral results, the visibility of local council members can be neglected when 
explaining electoral performance.
Other prominent positions like minister, national party leader, and key posi-
tions in parliament do not influence candidate vote share. The visibility that goes 
with holding these positions is not utilized in terms of electoral performance. This 
finding points to the conclusion that in Hungary, only locally relevant career tra-
jectories matter in increasing vote share, whereas national-level visibility does not 
add up to the final results. Consequently, parties that want to better their perfor-
mance in the SMDs should nominate experienced, locally attached candidates to 
obtain this goal.
Table 4
Random intercepts multilevel models explaining ticket splitting
Model 9 Model 10
 DV: Ticket Splitting DV: Ticket Splitting
Variables B (Se) B (Se)
SMD incumbency −1.64 (0.27)*** −1.60 (0.35)***
SMD tenure 1.29 (0.16)*** 1.26 (0.17)***
List MP 0.54 (0.19)*** 0.61 (0.24)**
Joint candidacy 1.12 (0.22)*** 0.61 (0.28)**
Multiple candidacy −0.71 (0.35)** −1.33 (1.18)
government party −0.17 (0.07)** −0.35 (0.15)**
Dominant party −1.26 (0.17)*** −1.38 (0.28)***
electoral competition −0.02 (0.02) −0.11 (0.08)
electoral margin (t - 1) 0.32 (0.35) −0.74 (0.64)
Ticket splitting (t - 1) 0.25 (0.03)***
Same district 0.48 (0.19)**
Intercept 1.15 (0.34)*** 2.13 (1.20)*
SMD: sd(_cons) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Candidate: sd(_cons) 1.19 (0.10) 0.00 (0.00)
sd(Residual) 2.79 (0.13) 3.59 (0.22)
Wald χ2 185.55 285.55
N 6,051 1,961
Log pseudo-likelihood −15,272.80 −5,287.85
Note: see Table 1.
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Conclusions
In this article, I investigated whether incumbency, legislative experience in 
a single-member district, and the mayoral position act as personal vote-earning 
attributes and affect the candidate’s capacity to achieve a better electoral result. 
I used random intercepts multilevel models to test the effects of these factors 
on candidate vote share in Hungary at five consecutive elections between 1994 
and 2010. I find that incumbents are at a disadvantage in SMDs, while candi-
dates with substantial legislative experience and mayors can expect larger vote 
shares.
Table 5
Random intercepts multilevel models explaining the SMD vote share of MPs
Model 11
 DV: Vote Share
Variables B (Se)
SMD incumbency 0.051 (0.31)
SMD tenure 0.78 (0.15)***
Mayor 2.07 (0.56)***
Local council member 0.28 (0.38)
Minister 1.00 (0.46)**
Party leader 0.27 (0.29)
Parliamentary office 0.24 (0.22)
Party vote share in SMD 0.85 (0.02)***
Joint candidacy 1.20 (0.55)**
Multiple candidacy 0.28 (1.76)
government party −1.69 (0.24)***
Dominant party −0.35 (0.29)
electoral competition −0.81 (0.12)***
electoral margin (t - 1) 1.63 (1.32)
Intercept 7.36 (2.14)***
SMD: sd(_cons) 0.00 (0.00)
Candidate: sd(_cons) 1.74 (0.21)
sd(Residual) 3.21 (0.27)
Wald χ2 24,331.18
N 1,212
Log pseudo-likelihood −3,275.58
Note: see Table 1.
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The first finding is at odds with the literature on the relationship between incum-
bency and electoral performance. although there have been no systematic voter sur-
veys in Hungary to answer why voters punish not only government candidates but 
incumbents as well, I argue that voters pick candidates restrospectively just as they 
pick parties. Trying out newcomers appears better to voters than sticking with the 
old-timers. The effects being rather small, these tendencies do not change the fate of 
candidates. They even manage to make an advantage from the disadvantage in the 
long run: candidates with more extensive SMD experience are able to increase their 
vote shares. Interestingly, it was found that candidates are only able to benefit from 
their experiences as SMD MPs when they are challengers; thus, the positive neutral-
izing effect of SMD tenure is not constant in their case. Future research could shed 
light on why voters punish incumbents regardless of their party affiliations and why 
experience does not help candidates to neutralize the negative effects of incumbency 
immediately.
Interestingly, national-level positions that would ensure great visibility do not 
increase vote share. It seems that voters value local attachments—especially those of 
mayors—more than national-level experience. This finding may anticipate several 
developments in Hungarian politics. Most importantly, the 2011 law transforming 
the electoral system prohibits MPs to hold elected positions at the local level. Voters 
prefer mayors as their MPs, but the two positions are to be separated entirely. 
Therefore, it is to be expected that the link between the constituency and the legisla-
tive seat weakens. This could have severe consequences with regards to the quality 
of representation in Hungary.
a substantial part of the literature tries to separate personal vote effects and the 
strategic consideration of voting. In this study, the strategic aspect of voting was 
captured by whether or not the candidate was affiliated with a dominant party. It was 
found that the effect of this variable outweights incumbency effects, suggesting that 
ticket splitting arises more dominantly out of strategic motivations than candidate 
centredness. Despite this, the findings of the study still point to the importance of 
electoral rules in shaping voting behaviour. The results are in concordance with the 
conclusions of previous research: Whenever voters are given the opportunity to 
choose between persons, they take candidate characteristics into account, which is 
shown to be a human tendency.89 Regardless of the party-centeredness of eastern 
european politics, personal characteristics of the candidates can influence electoral 
performance. Of course, selecting locally attached candidates will not change the 
power relations between parties. However, even if the effects are small in the relative 
sense, they indicate that voters trust candidates with local attachments more than 
candidates with national-level visibility. Therefore, giving the opportunity for the 
voters to choose between individuals and selecting locally embedded candidates 
might have consequences with regards to the quality of representation and the overall 
evaluation of democracy.
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Appendix A
List of variables in the analysis
Variable Contents Comments
SMD vote share Vote share of the candidate in the SMD  
SMD vote share 
(t - 1)
The lagged SMD vote share: the SMD vote share of the 
candidate at the preceding elections
 
Ticket splitting Candidate vote share minus party vote share in the SMD  
Ticket splitting  
(t - 1)
Candidate vote share minus party vote share in the SMD at 
the preceding elections
 
Party vote share Vote share of the candidate’s party on the regional party list 
in the SMD
 
SMD incumbency The candidate/MP was an SMD MP at the time of the actual 
election
0 = no, 1 = yes
SMD tenure The number of terms served as an SMD MP before the 
actual election
 
List MP The candidate was a party list MP at the time of the actual 
election
0 = no, 1 = yes
Joint candidacy The candidate was nominated by multiple parties jointly at 
the actual election
0 = no, 1 = yes
Same district Candidate is in the same SMD as last time 0 = no, 1 = yes
government party The candidate was nominated by a government party 0 = no, 1 = yes
Dominant party Candidate of Fidesz or MSZP 0 = no, 1 = yes
electoral  
competition
The effective number of candidates in the SMD: 
N =
∑
1
Pi
2
 
electoral margin electoral margin in the SMD at the previous elections 
Votes Votes
Votes
Candidate Candidate
Total
−
 
Multiple  
candidacy
The candidate was nominated on multiple tiers of the elec-
toral system
0 = no, 1 = yes
Relative regional 
list position
The candidate’s position on the regional party list divided 
by the number of candidates on that particular regional list
 
Relative national 
list position
The candidate’s position on the national party list divided 
by the number of candidates on that particular national list
 
Mayor The candidate is a mayor during the preceding electoral 
term
0 = no, 1 = yes
Local council 
member
The candidate is a member of the local council during the 
preceding electoral term
0 = no, 1 = yes
Minister The candidate serves as a minister sometime during the pre-
ceding electoral term
0 = no, 1 = yes
Party leader The candidate is a party leader during the preceding elec-
toral term
0 = no, 1 = yes
Parliamentary 
position
The candidate holds office in parliament during the preced-
ing electoral term (committee chair, PPg leader, speaker, 
vice president, clerk)
0 = no, 1 = yes
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Appendix B
Random intercepts multilevel models
Model 1 Model a1 Model a2
 DV: Logged Vote Share DV: Vote Share DV: Logged Vote Share
 Weights: None Weights: None Weights: Vote Share
Variables B (Se) B (Se) B (Se)
SMD incumbency −0.07 (0.02)*** −1.14 (0.25)*** −0.05 (0.02)***
SMD tenure 0.06 (0.01)*** 1.39 (0.15)*** 0.02 (0.01)**
Control variables included
Intercept 0.32 (0.03)*** 1.73 (0.34) 0.89 (0.09)***
SMD: sd(_cons) 0.03 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 0.04 (0.01)
Candidate:  
sd(_cons)
0.16 (0.01) 1.29 (0.09) 0.41 (0.00)
sd(Residual) 0.24 (0.01) 2.58 (0.11) 0.11 (0.00)
Wald χ2 58,525.4 70,910.75 3,211.07
N 6,050 6,051 6,050
Log pseudo-
likelihood
−939.90 −14,967.93 55,400.60
Note: see Table 1
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Appendix C 
Diagnostic plots of Models 1, A1 and A2
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